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Abstract 
 
The anti-poverty impact of national social assistance programs in eight Central and Eastern European 
countries is examined using data from the EU-SILC. Results indicate that social assistance programs 
achieve only limited poverty reduction while spending a significant amount of their resources on the 
non-poor. The more extensive and generous programs achieve higher effectiveness in reducing 
poverty. Efficiency on the other hand appears to be linked only to program size and not to benefit 
levels. Unlike Western Europe, no trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency could be detected.  
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1 Introduction 
Social assistance schemes have often been termed the ultimate measure by which a 
welfare state should be judged (Kuivalainen, 2005a; Behrendt, 1999), due to acting as a last 
resort safeguard against material destitution. Recent trends in work casualization and 
recurring unemployment have weakened the capacity of traditional insurance programmes to 
provide income protection. In response, social assistance programmes have grown in 
importance (Ditch, 1999a). Yet, despite their potentially important part within national social 
policy, the way they function and the results they achieve are not well understood. More 
importantly, variation in program outcomes rather than program characteristics has been less 
well documentedi. With some exceptions (Nelson, 2010; Van Mechelen and Marchal, 2013), 
this lack of evidence is even more salient for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This 
paper aims at filling the gap by examining in a comparative perspective the effectiveness and 
efficiency of social assistance schemes in Central and Eastern Europeii. It also provides 
evidence on the link between program characteristics (size and generosity) and program 
outcomes. In examining program performance, special attention is paid to the issue of a trade-
off between effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
2 Social assistance and poverty: cross-national comparisons in Europe 
 
Research on European social assistance programs has largely focused on analysing 
program characteristics, either from an expenditure point of view, or from an institutional 
perspective (Marx and Nelson, 2013; Lodemel and Schulte, 1992; Heikkilä and Keskitalo, 
2001; Guibentif and Bouget, 1997; Behrendt, 2000; Eardley et al., 1996; Gough et al., 1997; 
Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; Kuivalainen, 2005a). Recognizing the drawbacks of relying 
solely on expenditure data, a distinct approach has relied on model families to measure 
benefit levels, often including cash benefits other than social assistance payments (Van 
Mechelen and Marchal, 2013; Van Mechelen et al., 2011; Nelson, 2010; Nelson, 2007). Both 
approaches outlined above place the emphasis on program characteristics, especially benefit 
levels, implicitly assuming that more generous programs are more effective at poverty 
alleviation. Indeed, a number of studies have found that benefit generosity is an important 
factor influencing the impact of means-tested benefits on poverty (Notten and Gassman, 
2008; Saraceno, 2002).  
2 
 
Beyond benefit generosity, comparisons between the UK and Nordic and Continental 
countries found that the extensive and strongly institutionalised British system outperformed 
other national social assistance programs, especially when reduction of severe poverty was 
concerned (Hölsch and Kraus, 2006; Behrendt, 1999; Behrendt, 2000).  
Several studies have suggested that there may be a trade-off between generosity and 
extensiveness. In particular, larger social assistance benefits may be politically and 
financially not sustainable if access to the program is not restricted and caseloads are large 
(Kuivalainen, 2005b; de Neubourg et al., 2007; Ditch, 1999b; Hanesch, 1999). However, 
since both extensiveness and benefit generosity have been associated with better outcomes in 
terms of poverty reduction, it is not clear which program characteristic is more important or 
how the importance varies with the characteristics of the poor.  
Studies on the effects of social assistance on poverty in Central and Eastern Europe 
are few and far betweeniii. Using data on the size of the program population and benefit 
levels, Milanovic (2000a) builds a three-way typology of social assistance programs but fails 
to find any consistent correlations between program type and either program effectiveness or 
efficiency. Other attempts to determine the effects of social assistance schemes on the 
region’s poverty levels and intensity resulted in small impact estimates (Fox, 2003; Ringold 
et al., 2007; Milanovic, 2000b). However, these results pertain to programmes in operation 
during the 1990s and the (very) early 2000s.  
In principle, there should be no conflict between the twin goals of social assistance 
programs of maximizing poverty reduction (effectiveness) and minimizing the amount of 
resources going to the non-poor (efficiency). All other things equal, increasing efficiency 
should result in more resources being available for poverty mitigation (Coady et al., 2004). 
However, in practice, a trade-off may emerge for two reasons. On the one hand, large means-
tested transfers can create an incentive to claim even when not poor, especially when the 
tools used to measure need are imprecise and/or aspects being measured are subject to 
manipulation. Anticipating this, policy makers will want to either restrict access or lower 
benefits to make the program less appealing, both of which will reduce the impact on 
poverty. On the other hand, increasing efficiency by limiting transfers to the non-poor may 
erode their political support and make them vulnerable to cuts (Nelson, 2004; Korpi and 
Palme, 1998). In fact, a trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency of income transfers 
generally has been documented among developed countries although its strength appears to 
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be weaker in the case of poverty alleviation compared to inequality reduction (Mitchell, 
1996). 
In the specific case of means-tested benefits, it is often assumed that setting higher 
income thresholds and thus making available more generous benefits will, all else equal, 
make the program more effective but also less efficient (Sipos and Ringold, 2005; Ringold et 
al., 2007). However, program eligibility rules are often more complex than a simple income 
threshold, taking into account household composition, capacity to work, and/or accumulated 
assets. Local/ street level discretion often supplements formal rules and the administration of 
the program can be highly salient both for maximizing effectiveness and minimizing 
inefficiency. As such, a trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency should not be inferred 
a priori.  
Building on the existing literature, this paper complements and expands previous 
findings in a number of ways. First, it provides evidence on the outcomes of social assistance 
programs in terms of poverty mitigation effectiveness and efficiency. Second, it probes for 
systematic associations between program features, namely size of the population served and 
benefit generosity and program outcomes. Third, it brings new evidence on the question of 
potential trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency. Fourth, it is the first paper to focus 
exclusively on Central and East European countries, a region that has so far received 
relatively little attention. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 presents the 
methodology and data used in the calculations. Section 4 describes the two program 
characteristics that are of interest, namely program size and benefit generosity. Indicators of 
program effectiveness and efficiency are shown in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 examines the 
possibility of a trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency. Section 8 presents associations 
between program characteristics and outcomes while section 9 concludes.   
 
3 Data and Methods 
 Previous work on social assistance/minimum income schemes has relied heavily on 
model families. While using model families avoids a series of problems such as issues with 
the cross-national comparability of minimum income packages or problems with reported 
incomes in surveys, it also presents a number of drawbacks  (see for example Figari et al., 
2013: for an expanded review of this issue). Most importantly for our purposes, model 
families cannot be used to assess the concrete outcomes of a social assistance program. That 
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task requires information on actual income distributions, as well as reviewing actual rather 
than intended/hypothetical payments.  
In this paper, social assistance programs are evaluated based on a series of pre-transfer 
- post-transfer comparisons. This approach is relatively simple and straightforward and any 
poverty reduction thus detected can unambiguously be attributed to program participation. It 
also has the advantage that any poverty reduction outcomes can be computed relative to 
existing needs before the transfer. In total, three indicators relating to program effectiveness 
and two related to program efficiency have been computed. Here, effectiveness is referred to 
as the capacity of the program to mitigate poverty, as calculated before social assistance 
transfers. As such, in calculating effectiveness indicators, an implicit comparison is made 
between the (equivalised) income distribution before social assistance but after all other 
social payments (including public pensions, and unemployment, sickness, disability, family 
etc. benefits) and final equivalised disposable income (i.e. after social assistance payments). 
Thus, unlike expenditure based indicators where generosity and needs are conflated, our 
indicators explicitely take into account that countries with more extensive social insurance 
programs will likely have smaller client pools. Efficiency indicators relate to the ability of a 
program to direct resources towards poverty mitigation only, i.e. its ability to minimize the 
amount of resources that are not directly linked to poverty reduction. Obviously, in this case 
poverty is defined based on equivalised disposable income before social assistance (but after 
all other social payments). It should be noted that this approach relies on the assumption that 
social assistance acts as a „last resort” type of payment and that it essentialy functions like a 
top-up after all the other elements of the welfare state have been exhausted.  
Indicators are calculated using micro-data from the 2005-2011 cross-sectional waves 
of the European Union-Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), covering 
incomes from 2004 to 2010. Social assistance payments are calculated as the sum of social 
exclusion income and means-tested housing allowancesiv. Social exclusion income in SILC is 
largely a residual category that may contain benefits that are very different across different 
countries. In principle, this would pose a serious comparability problem. However, in the 
countries included in this study, social assistance mostly contains minimum guaranteed 
income payments, means-tested transfers related to housing, assistance disbursed by local 
authorities and irregular or one-off paymentsv.  
Housing allowances are added because housing related payments can make a large 
difference to the social assistance package (see Van Mechelen and Marchal, 2013). 
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Additionally, since housing allowances cannot always be separated from the overall social 
assistance benefit, inclusion of means-tested housing allowance is necessary for reasons of 
comparability.  
With the exception of Slovenia which provides register data, the other countries use 
survey questions to collect information on incomes. Given receipt of means-tested benefits is 
often associated with stigma, information on this type of income is particularly susceptible to 
underreporting. Total net disposable income may also be underestimated owing to the large 
informal economy present in the region. Nevertheless, keeping these shortcomings in mind, 
the EU-SILC still constitutes the best data source for a comparative study of means-tested 
benefits in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 Poverty is defined as having a household equivalisedvi disposable income below 
50%vii of the median. In assessing the relationship between poverty characteristics and social 
assistance transfers, poverty is taken to be a household concept. Similarly, amounts of social 
assistance received are calculated at the household level. This is both because information at 
a more disaggregated level is unavailable in SILC and because resources are assumed to be 
equally shared among household members even if the transfer unit may be narrower than the 
household. As a sensitivity check, indicators have been computed both for the entire 
household population and restricted to single social assistance unit households. While some 
differences do exist, they are small and do not affect the substantive conclusions emerging 
from the main analysis (comparisons are available from the author). 
Finally, an important caveat when using pre-transfer post-transfer comparisons is that 
this methodology cannot take into account any behavioural effects stemming from the 
existence of the programs themselves. In particular, an important assumption underlying the 
analysis is that the distribution of income in the absence of social assistance can be 
approximated reasonably accurately by summing up all income sources received by the 
household with the exception of social assistance. Clearly, if individuals adjust their 
behaviour in response to the existence of the program (for example, by working less, see  
Barnow et. al (2000), Blank (2009), or Ziliak (2009) for some examples) this assumption is 
violated. Nonetheless, pre-transfer post-transfer comparisons are still a straightforward and 
informative way to obtain prima facie evidence on program outcomes. 
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4 Social assistance in Central and East European Countries 
 
Previous descriptive work on social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe has 
found that programs generally reached small shares of the population and have constituted 
only a tiny fraction in overall social expenditure (Fox, 2003; Ringold et al., 2007).  In this 
section, we present information on the size of the recipient population as well as on average 
benefits paid out in the eight countries between 2004 and 2010.  
To contextualize information about program characteristics, Figure 1 presents 
information on poverty rates and poverty gaps in the region. Cross-national differences are 
more clear-cut in the case of poverty rates where the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia cluster together having poverty rates below 10% throughout the entire period, 
whereas poverty rates are higher in the remaining countries. If, instead, we focus on poverty 
gaps, cross-national differences are somewhat smallerviii but the country rankings and the 
time trends are similar. 
 
[INSERT Fig. 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 2 shows the share of the population receiving social assistance benefits, 
whereas the average level of benefits as a % of the poverty line is shown in Figure 3. The 
highest proportion of social assistance recipients is registered in Hungary and Slovenia 
(around 15%) and the lowest in Estonia (around 3%). Considerable variation exists across 
countries and to a lesser extent across years. With the exception of Hungary and Lithuania, 
there is a mild convergence trend, as receipt rates in countries with very low initial values 
increase somewhat between 2004 and 2010 whereas the opposite trend is observed in the 
countries with higher initial receipt rates.  
 
[INSERT Fig 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT Fig. 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Average disbursed benefits (as a % of the poverty line) are much more stable over 
time. The Czech and Slovak Republics clearly have higher benefit levels compared to the 
other countries. Unlike studies based on West European social assistance schemes levels 
7 
 
(Obinger, 1999; Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; Figari et al., 2013), we do not find a 
negative relationship between program size and generosity (as measured by benefit levels). In 
fact, the correlation between program size and benefit levels is low (-0.07) and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
It should be noted at this point that both average benefit levels as well as the share of 
population receiving will depend to some extent not only on the design of the social 
assistance programs but also on the characteristics of the population. For example, all else 
equal, more inequality of market and social security incomes in the lower half of the 
distribution will translate into a larger share of social assistance recipients as well as higher 
benefit amounts. Yet, it makes little sense to assess the institutional features of a social 
assistance program in the abstract, without reference to the population it is expected to serve. 
Since program performance (i.e. effectiveness and efficiency) is assessed relative to the 
characteristics of the population actually being served by the program, it makes sense to 
measure program features (i.e. extensiveness and generosity) relative to the same population 
characteristics. 
In the following section, we examine the capacity of the social assistance programs to 
reduce poverty, i.e. program effectiveness. 
 
5 Program effectiveness: how much is poverty reduced by social assistance? 
 
Program effectiveness can be broken down into two dimensions, i.e. whether the 
program is able to reach the poor and whether it transfers enough resources to bring them 
above the poverty line. We analyse each in turn.  
Figure 4 shows the share of the poor populationix that receives any social assistance 
transfers, henceforth referred to as program coverage. Formally, if yi is the total household 
equivalised income before social assistance payments, si is the equivalised social assistance 
payment received by the household, z is the poverty line and wi is the individual weight, then 
program coverage can be defined as  
 =
∑ 	
|	)


∑ )


      (1) 
 
Relative to the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic have higher shares of the poor population receiving benefits (between half and two 
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thirds versus 15-20%). However, coverage levels drop significantly after 2007 in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics. In Poland and the Baltic state, both indicators improve slightly 
whereas in Hungary they improve dramatically over the period. As a result, a clear 
convergence trend emerges. 
A clear test of how successful social assistance schemes are in reaching their ultimate 
goal is their ability to bring the poor over the poverty line. Figure 5 gives information on the 
relative reduction of the headcount rate among the total population and among social 
assistance clients achieved through social assistance transfers. Keeping the same notation as 
in (1), the relative reduction in the headcount index due to social assistance can be written as  
 =
∑ )∑ ))




∑ )


		     (2) 
 
[INSERT Fig. 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The ability of social assistance transfers to lift the poor over the poverty line is 
relatively low in all eight countries. In the beginning of the period there are large differences 
between the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the 
other countries. Yet, poverty reduction drops significantly in all three countries by 2010. 
Given that coverage levels are very low in some countries, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the relative reduction in the poverty headcount index is limited. However, the second half 
of Figure 5 shows that low coverage on its own cannot explain these results. In particular, 
poverty rate reductions measured among social assistance recipients only, while higher than 
in the case of the general population, are still well below 100%. This suggests that benefit 
payments play an important role in limiting the anti-poverty effectiveness of social assistance 
programs.  
To investigate whether programs that are better able to reach the poor are also more 
likely to bring the poor they do reach above the poverty line, we examine the relationship 
between program coverage and the poverty rate reduction among social assistance recipients 
attributable to the program. Care must be taken when interpreting the second indicator as 
social assistance recipients are usually not a random sample of the population. All other 
things equal, a social assistance program will achieve better outcomes among the recipient 
population the less disadvantaged this subpopulation is. Thus, in calculating the correlation 
coefficient, we adjust for the poverty rate and the poverty gap of social assistance recipients 
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(before social assistance transfers) relative to those of the total population. We find that the 
partial correlation between coverage and the average reduction in the poverty rate of social 
assistance recipients is positive (0.65) and highly significant. 
Very similar results are obtained if effectiveness is measured as the relative reduction 
in the poverty gap attributable to social assistancex. The levels of reduction are somewhat 
higher, between 3% and 44% for the total population and between 28% and 72% for social 
assistance recipients. Yet, country rankings and time trends observed between 2004 and 2010 
are very similar to the ones displayed by the headcount index. Again, we find that adjusting 
for the poverty of social assistance recipients relative to that of the general populations, there 
is a strong positive (0.81) and statistically significant correlation between coverage and the 
share of the poverty gap closed by social assistance transfers among the recipient population. 
 
6 Program efficiency: what share of program resources are directed to the poor? 
 
Social assistance schemes achieve their results at very different costs to the public 
budget. To assess how efficient the various systems are, we look at the extensiveness of 
inclusion errors, i.e. how many of the recipients are not income poor before receiving the 
benefitxi. Keeping with the previous notation, the share of the non-poor among recipients is 
 =
∑ 	|		
)


∑ 	
)


      (3) 
 
Figure 6 shows that inclusion errors are indeed common throughout all eight countries 
included in the study. The most efficient programs (Estonia in 2004 and the Czech Republic 
in 2011) still direct around a third of transfers to the non-poor.  
 
 [INSERT Fig. 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To investigate the possibility of programs covering many non-poor but still directing 
the bulk of their resources to the poor, we compute the share of the total social assistance 
expenditure that goes towards filling the poverty gapxii. Formally, the indicator is 
 =
∑ ,).)


∑ 


     (4) 
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Results indicate that social assistance programs ‘waste’ a significant share of their 
resources. In the most wasteful countries (Hungary and Latvia), well below half of the total 
social assistance transfers (and in some years as little as 17%) actually contributes towards 
reducing the poverty gap. Even in the most efficient countries (Czech Republic and Estonia) 
the share of well targeted spending is below 75%. Unsurprisingly, countries with high 
leakage in terms of clients served also have high leakage in terms of the amounts spent. The 
correlation between the share of the non-poor among recipients and the share of well targeted 
spending is large (-0.82) and highly significant. 
 
7 Is there a trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency? 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the literature sometimes presumes the existence of a trade-off 
between the effectiveness and the efficiency of income transfer programs. In the following, 
we assess empirically the existence of a trade-off in the case of social assistance programs in 
Central and Eastern Europe, using both cross-national and cross-temporal variation. Figure 7 
plots the extent of exclusion errors (i.e. the share of the poor that do not receive any transfers) 
against the level of inclusion errors (i.e. the share of the program clients that are not poor 
before transfers). It is clear from the graph that there is no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between the two types of errors. While the actual correlation has the expected 
negative sign, its magnitude is very small (-0.09) and is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.  
 
[INSERT Fig. 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The lack of an effectiveness-efficiency trade-off is also supported by total expenditure 
indicators. Comparing the total national poverty gap filled by social assistance transfers (an 
effectiveness indicator) with the share of the total social assistance payments that is well 
targeted (an efficiency indicator), we find that the two indicators are positively related (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.39 and statistically significant). Social assistance programs that 
succeed in filling a larger portion of the total national poverty gap are also the programs that 
limit most effectively disbursements to the non-poor. Thus, both sets of results are consistent 
and reject the hypothesis of a trade-off between program effectiveness and efficiency.  
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8 Social assistance outcomes and program characteristics 
 
Social assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe do not have a major impact 
on poverty. There is however considerable variation both across countries and across time in 
both efficiency and effectiveness indicators. This section examines whether variation in 
outcomes systematically matches differences in program characteristics, namely the size of 
the recipients population and average benefit levels. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 1 presents correlation coefficients between the size of the social assistance 
programs (measured as the share of the population receiving benefits) and average benefit 
levels (as % of the poverty line) on the one hand and the effectiveness and efficiency 
indicators discussed in Sections 5 and 6 on the other hand. Because a large part of the 
variation both in program performance indicators as well as program characteristics comes 
from cross-national differences, both unadjusted correlations and correlations adjustedxiii for 
country fixed effects are shownxiv. 
Both program characteristics (size and benefit generosity) are positively correlated 
with effectiveness measures, albeit the adjusted correlations are not significant in the case of 
benefit generosity. Thus, the initial hypotheses that programs that are more extensive and/or 
more generous are better able to mitigate poverty are confirmed.   
In the case of efficiency indicators, only the share of the population receiving benefits 
confirms the expected pattern of a negative relationship. Programs serving a larger share of 
the population are both more likely to leak benefits to the non-poor and to spend less of their 
resources on actually filling the poverty gap. However, the relationship becomes much 
weaker (and in fact insignificant in the case of the second efficiency indicator) once time-
invariant country characteristics are controlled for.  
The expected negative relationship between program size/ benefit levels and program 
efficiency is confirmed only in part. A negative link between benefit levels and efficiency is 
not supported by the data. Unadjusted correlation coefficients between efficiency indicators 
and average benefit levels are actually positive while adjusted ones are close to zero. This 
suggests that it is possible for social assistance programs to be more generous without 
necessarily having to compromise on efficiency.  
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9 Conclusions 
 Previous studies of social assistance focused largely on program characteristics as 
opposed to program outcomes and with a few recent exceptions, have ignored countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This paper has sought to address these gaps by first documenting 
the effectiveness and efficiency of social assistance schemes in eight CEE countries across 
six years and second by examining the existence in the region of a trade-off between 
effectiveness and efficiency as predicted by the economic literature. Lastly, correlations 
between effectiveness and efficiency indicators and two program characteristics are 
discussed. 
Results indicate that, variation in program performance notwithstanding, social 
assistance programs are rather ineffectual and inefficient in dealing with poverty in all eight 
CEE countries. The results mirror findings emerging from research on West European 
countries (de Neubourg et al., 2007; Nelson, 2004). The low poverty reduction achieved by 
social assistance schemes in CEE countries is probably unsurprising given the (very) low 
level of benefits (Van Mechelen and Marchal, 2013; Nelson, 2010) and small program 
expenditure (Frazier and Marlier, 2009) typical of this region. In addition to the overall lack 
of resources, the ability of social assistance programs to cut poverty is severely hampered by 
their inability to reach the poor. This is true of all eight countries included in this study, albeit 
to varying degrees. In addition, social assistance programs that are better able to reach the 
poor also have a higher impact on the poverty of those they do reach. 
Generally, larger programs as well as programs with higher benefits are associated 
with increased effectiveness. This finding is consistent with studies based on West European 
programs that have found that either higher benefit levels such as those in the Nordic 
countries (Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; Kuivalainen, 2005a) or the increased program 
reach in the UK (Behrendt, 2002) are associated with superior program outcomes. Efficiency 
is not associated with benefit generosity but does appear to be linked to program size. More 
extensive social assistance schemes appear to have difficulty both in keeping the poor out and 
in limiting spillover payments that do not contribute toward poverty reduction.   
 Lastly, unlike Western Europe (Hölsch and Kraus, 2006), there appears to be no 
trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency in the region. The lack of a trade-off is verified 
both by examining targeting performance and total expenditure patterns. These results 
suggest the efficiency of means testing may depend more on the implementation capacity 
rather than the level of benefits. In addition, access to the program may depend on a more 
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complex set of rules than the income test alone. Both aspects may explain why a clear 
negative relationship between average benefit levels and program efficiency fails to be 
detected. 
Future research should focus on unbundling program characteristics and establishing 
which program features, aside from benefit levels and program size, are consistently 
associated with better program outcomes. In particular, little is known about how social 
assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe are administered as opposed to their 
design. Currently, most exercises of this type rely on cross-national variation which is bound 
to be limiting. However, recent reforms in the area of means-tested benefits offer the 
opportunity of using not only cross-country but also cross-temporal variation. 
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Table 1 Correlations between program characteristics and indicators of program effectiveness 
and efficiency 
 
 % of poor 
receiving 
benefits  
% reduction 
in the 
poverty rate-
total 
population 
% reduction 
in the 
poverty gap-
total 
population 
% of 
recipients 
poor before 
transfers 
% well 
targeted 
social 
assistance 
Share of the population receiving social assistance benefits 
Unadjusted 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.55*** -0.67*** -0.57*** 
Adjusted for country 
fixed effects 
0.72*** 0.78*** 0.74*** -0.27* -0.12 
Average benefit levels      
Unadjusted 0.40** 0.38** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 
Adjusted for country 
fixed effects 
0.16 0.32* 0.22 -0.03 -0.21 
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the cross-sectional waves of EU-SILC 2005-2011 
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Figure 1: Poverty levels in CEE countries, 2004 -2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of the population receiving social assistance transfers 
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Figure 3: Average social assistance benefits paid as % of the poverty line 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of the poor population receiving benefits (coverage) 
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Figure 5: Average percent reduction in the poverty rate through social assistance-total 
population (top) and social assistance clients (bottom) 
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Figure 6: Percent recipients who are non-poor before social assistance transfers 
(leakage) 
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Figure 7: Exclusion vs. inclusion errors of social assistance programs in CEE 
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i
 There is a large literature in the US and UK on reforms to social assistance programs which looks especially at 
employment but ocassionally also at other well-being indicators such as income, health etc. See for example Frogner B, 
Moffit R and Ribar DC. (2009) Income, Employment, and Welfare Receipt after Welfare Reform: 1999-2005 from the 
Three-City Study. http://www.jhu.edu/threecitystudy, Moffitt R. (2002) Welfare Programs and Labor Supply. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, Ziliak JP. (2009) Welfare Reform and Its Long-
Term Consequences for America's Poor. New York: Cambridge University Press, Blank RM. (2009) What We Know, 
What We Don't Know, and What We Need to Know about Welfare Reform. In: Ziliak JP (ed) Welfare Reform and Its 
Long-Term Consequences for America's Poor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 22-58. 
However, what is missing from these studies is an attemtp to generalize and draw persistent links between program 
characteristics and outcomes. 
ii
 Eight CEE countries are analyzed: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. 
iii
 There is a large literature on the effect of public transfers in general on poverty and inequality; however, the role of 
public transfers generally is outside the scope of this paper. 
iv
 Gross amounts are used when available; when this is missing, information from the net series is used based on the 
assumption that social assistance payments are usually non-taxable. 
v
 This information has been gathered as part of the EUROMOD project; see https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod. 
vi
 Using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
vii
 To check the sensitivity of results, effectiveness and efficiency indicators have been calculated using a poverty 
threshold of 40% of median equivalised disposable income; results remain substantively the same. 
viii
 The coefficient of cross-national variation ranges between 30 and 46 (depending on year) in the case of poverty rates 
and between 10 and 21 in the case of poverty gaps. 
ix
 The share of the poor population receiving transfers is computed relative to those poor before social assistance 
payments. 
x
 Formally, the indicator can be written as  =
∑ ).)∑ ).))




∑ ).)


 
xi
 It should be kept in mind that we are using annual incomes to compute poverty status; as incomes fluctuates throughout 
the year, it is possible that some individuals and households may be poor during some periods of the year; however, this 
cannot explain leakage rates in excess of 70% as at any given point in time, the majority of the poor are likely to be long-
term. 
xii
 In fact, well targeted expenditure is considered to be only expenditure filling the poverty gap; thus non-targeted 
expenditure is composed of benefits paid out to the non-poor as well as benefits paid out to the poor that are in excess of 
bringing them above the poverty line; the indicator is similar to the one defined in Beckerman W. (1978) The Impact of 
Income Maintenance Payments on Poverty in Britain, 1975. The Economic Journal 89(354): 261-279. 
xiii
 These are standardized (i.e. beta) regression coefficients from a pooled time series that controls for country fixed 
effects. 
xiv
 Year fixed effects are generally not significant and so have not been included in the final specification as the number 
of observations is relatively small (56); including them does not change the main results. 
